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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PER SE
RULE IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST
PROSECUTIONS
James J. Brosnahan* and
William J. Dowling III**
I. INTRODUCTION
The tumultuous history of the application of section 1 of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act' has resulted in a dichotomized
rule regarding agreements alleged to restrain trade illegally.
The original "rule of reason" test' forbids restraints of trade
which are judicially determined to prejudice the public interest
in an unreasonable manner.3 However, certain classes of con-
duct, such as price-fixing, territorial allocation of customers,
boycotts, and deliberate suppression of competition are
deemed unreasonable per se.' This threshold determination
prevents courts from analyzing in any detail the reasonable-
ness-that is, the actual economic effect-of activities which
fall within these classes.
Thus the "per se rule" is used in federal antitrust litigation
by the Government, or by the plaintiff claiming injury, as an
irrebuttable or conclusive presumption' that certain types of
* B.S.B.A., 1956, Boston College; LL.B., 1959, Harvard University; Member,
California Bar.
** A.B., 1964, Saint Mary's College, California; LL.B., 1967, University of San
Francisco; member, California Bar.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... "
2. This test was first applied in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
3. Cecil, The Remedies in An Antitrust Proceeding, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK
529 (1958).
4. Id. at 525. See notes 29-34 infra.
5. REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L. COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 11 (1955).
6. "Irrebuttable" and "conclusive" generally are used interchangeably to de-
scribe a presumption which has the evidentiary effect of foreclosing argument on an
issue once certain facts have been proved. "The proved facts may be disputed but their
effect in creating the presumed fact may not." Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statu-
tory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341, 342 & nn.12-14 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Criminal Presumptions].
A rebuttable presumption, by way of contrast, is an evidentiary construct used to
establish which party has the burden of proof. For example, if the proponent estab-
lishes Fact A, Fact B is presumed to exist unless its nonexistence is proved by the
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restraints are in fact unreasonable.7 It is the purpose of this
article to suggest that, in a criminal case, eliminating the Gov-
ernment's burden of proving each element of an antitrust viola-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt by introducing a conclusive
presumption which assumes the existence of an element of the
offense may be a denial of due process under the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Recent United States
Supreme Court decisions invalidating irrebuttable presump-
tions will be examined and their applicability to criminal anti-
trust law analyzed.'
A Case Study
The only decision dealing directly with the unconstitu-
tionality of the per se presumption is United States v. Manu-
facturers' Association of the Relocatable Building Indu&try,9 in
which both the trial and appellate courts rejected the constitu-
tional argument. Defendants in the case were a trade associa-
tion and its four members, who manufactured and distributed
relocatable buildings in a market consisting primarily of Cali-
fornia public school districts. As required by California law,
school district contracts for construction of relocatable struc-
tures built and marketed by the defendants were awarded
through a public bidding system.
Following incorporation of the association in early 1966, its
four members adopted a code of ethics setting forth the associa-
tion's general objectives: promoting the standing of its mem-
bers in the industry and improving standards of performance
in the industry as a whole. The Government indicted the defen-
dants under section 1 of the Sherman Act ° on the basis of a
single provision in the code of ethics stating that each of the
member manufacturers would "refuse to reduce his bid on a
rebid in less than sixty days." This provision was designed to
cover the situation that arises when, after soliciting and receiv-
ing original bids, a contracting district or agency-for reasons
opponent of the evidence. Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 449, 451 n.7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions]. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Stumbo, Presumptions
- A View at Chaos, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 182 (1964).
7. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST CASES
314, 497 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
9. 462 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1972). The authors participated as counsel for the trade
association defendant at trial and on appeal.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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such as errors in the bidding process, nonresponsible or exces-
sively high bids, bids over the agency's budget, legal problems,
or errors or ambiguities in specifications-has determined to
reject all bids and to call for sucessive rounds of bidding. Suc-
cessive invitations to bid were to be regarded as "rebids"
within the meaning of the association's code only if they in-
volved no substantial changes in the contracting agency's origi-
nal specifications; if there were changes in the specifications,
the successive rounds were to be regarded as completely new
bids, and thus were not governed by the "no reduction" provi-
sion.
The government took the position that this limited rebid
rule was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, in the nature
of price fixing. No charge was made, however, that bids sub-
mitted by defendants were not the product of free and open
competition; and in fact, individual bids were determined uni-
laterally and in highly competitive fashion. Defendants con-
tended that the rebid rule was not per se conduct, and that the
conclusive nature of the per se rule denied them due process of
law.
In accord with its per se theory, the Government offered
no evidence of the unreasonableness of the 60-day rebid provi-
sion. Defendants' successive motions for acquittal on the basis
of this failure of proof were denied.
Defendants offered the testimony of expert witnesses to
detail the several evils and abuses resulting from the adoption
by contracting agencies of a policy of soliciting rebids. The 60-
day rebid rule was designed to curtail those abuses."
The trial court accepted the Government's per se theory;
excluded the evidence of defendants' pro-competitive motiva-
11. The expert testimony would have shown that adherence to the Code would
not necessarily produce anticompetitive effects; that artificial inflation of bids ordinar-
ily resulted where rebids were invited, which lessens the effectiveness of the public
bidding system; that bidder's cost estimates tended to be uncertain where rebids were
a possibility, leading to inflation of original bids by inclusion of a risk premium; that
if rebids were expected, initial bids would be camouflaged to prevent competing bid-
ders from acquiring valuable pricing information; that rebids increased overhead, be-
cause each bid computation costs money, and this in turn increased price; that the
rebid rule of the Code actually conformed to a widespread and long standing industry
practice by purchasers not to put jobs out for rebids without changes in specifications;
that school districts would not benefit from a policy of rebidding; that the 60-day rebid
rule was not anticompetitive since it insured that bidders would put in their best price
on the first round; and that the rule tended to eliminate opportunities for corruption
and favoritism which occur when purchasers put out jobs for rebid without changing
specifications.
19751
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tion in adopting the association code, and of the various eco-
nomic factors justifying the rebid rule; denied defendants' mo-
tions to acquit despite the Government's failure to introduce
evidence that the rebid rule was unreasonable; and instructed
the jury that the case was governed by the per se rule.
A four-day jury trial resulted in conviction of all defen-
dants and imposition of fines, followed by an appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendants contended on ap-
peal that the Government's burden of proving unreason-
ableness beyond a reasonable doubt had been replaced with a
conclusive presumption that the rebid rule was in fact unrea-
sonable, thus denying due process rights guaranteed by the
fifth amendment.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Supreme
Court had consistently interpreted the Sherman Act as defin-
ing two distinct rules of substantive law applicable to two dif-
ferent classes of restraints: one type of conduct (price fixing, for
instance) is governed by the per se rule, and no showing of
unreasonableness is required; in all other cases, the challenged
activity must be proved to constitute an unreasonable re-
straint.1 In short, unreasonableness is an element of the offense
only when no per se violation has occurred. According to the
Ninth Circuit, "reasonableness" in this context "must be
viewed as a legal term, and not in its ordinary sense. When the
Supreme Court describes certain conduct as per se unreason-
able, they do no more than circumscribe the definition of 'un-
reasonableness.'", The court concluded:
While the appellants deserve credit for their ingenious and
novel attempt to trap the court in its own rhetoric, their
contention that the per se rule should be set aside must be
and is rejected. The per se rule does not establish a pre-
sumption. It is not even a rule of evidence.'4
Perhaps this is true, and the argument is semantic and
rhetorical, not constitutional. But it may also be that the argu-
ment was made too soon, that the courts have not yet been
forced to confront and evaluate the impact on the delicate
balance in a criminal case of a rule that is permitted to serve
as a substitute for actual evidence and proof. Possibly the rea-
son these questions have not been raised before is that few
12. 462 F.2d at 52.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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criminal antitrust cases are actually tried. In addition, serious
re-examination of the use of presumptions in criminal cases
had only recently begun when Manufacturers' Association
came before the federal court of appeals.'5
The authors believe the question raised is a valid and in-
teresting one, and that there is a more than colorable argument
that the use of the per se rule in a criminal case is repugnant
to the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
II. LACK OF REASONABLENESS IS A DISTINCT AND ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF A SHERMAN ACT CHARGE
The Underpinnings of the Sherman Act
There is no doubt that the Sherman Act has become a
fundamental and important element of the American social
and political system. The objectives of the Act were succinctly
summarized in Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Supreme
Court in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time provid-
ing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.'"
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were drafted against
the background of common law doctrines which imposed no
prohibition against restraints reasonably ancillary to a lawful
purpose. Enacting those statutes, Congress did not-as it
might have chosen to do, in the exercise of legislative discretion
-outlaw price fixing or any other specified conduct. Instead,
in the most general of terms, section 1 declares it to be a misde-
meanor to conspire "in restraint of trade."'" In equally general
terms, section 2 makes it a misdemeanor to "monopolize, or
15. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text infra. See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger,
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical
Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory
Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 141 (1966); Note, Criminal Presumptions,
supra note 6.
16. 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
1975]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with others to
monopolize" 8 any part of trade. In Appalachian Coals, Inc., v.
United States,9 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes praised the Act's
"generality and adaptability" on the theory that they provided
the kind of flexibility necessary to insure that the broad pur-
pose of the Act could be achieved without penalizing "legiti-
mate enterprise" through mechanical application of rigid rules.
The Rule of Reason
Despite the general and inclusive language of the Act, a
consistent line of decisions, dating at least from the 1911 case
of Standard Oil Co. v. United States,0 has established that not
all restraints are prohibited by Section 1; the provision pro-
scribes only those activities which are found to be "unreasona-
ble" or "undue" restraints on commerce. The concept again
was enunciated in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,2
in which Justice Brandeis pointed out that every agreement
concerning trade restrains, but that the test of legality under
the Act is whether a particular restraint operates to promote
competition, or to suppress or destroy competition.
As a result of these decisions, it has been common for
judges in cases involving per se restraints to instruct that, while
normally the jury would be asked to determine whether the
conduct at issue constitutes an unreasonable restraint, the case
before the court involves per se activity; thus, that issue has
been taken from them." When a case does go to the jury on the
question of unreasonableness, the factors to be considered in
arriving at a verdict are those enumerated by Mr. Justice Bran-
deis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States: (1) facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; (2)
the condition of the business before and after the restraint was
imposed; (3) the nature of the restraint and its effects, actual
or probable, on competition; (4) the history of the restraint; (5)
the evil believed to exist; (6) the reason for adopting the partic-
ular remedy; and (7) the purpose or ends sought to be
achieved.2
Since every business arrangement has as its very essence
18. Id. § 2.
19. 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
20. 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
21. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
22. See, e.g., JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 7, at 498-99.
23. 246 U.S. at 238.
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a binding and hence to some degree a restraining effect upon
its participants, the Brandeis analysis, which requires examin-
ing challenged conduct to determine its pro-competitive or
anticompetitive purpose and effect, is consistent with the Sher-
man Act's dominant purpose: promoting and fostering compe-
tition.24 Any other approach would eliminate opportunity for
the day to day exercise of business judgment and discretion
which is vital to the functioning of the free enterprise system.
Application of the enumerated factors to any given case,
of course, will be as varied as the business contexts in which
an antitrust question might be raised. In Chicago Board of
Trade, the Supreme Court dealt with a "call" rule governing
bids on grain "to arrive." Board members were forbidden to
purchase or offer to purchase, between the close of the call and
the opening of the session on the next business day, at any price
but the closing bid at the call. Before adoption of the rule,
members fixed their bids throughout the day at such prices as
they individually saw fit; after adoption of the rule, bids had
to be fixed at the day's closing bid on the call until the opening
of the next session. The rule was defended on the basis that its
purpose was not to prevent competition or control prices, but
to promote the convenience of members by restricting hours of
business, and to break up a monopoly in that branch of the
grain trade held by a small number of Chicago warehouses.
An analysis of the "call" rule in light of the factors set
forth above enabled Justice Brandeis to conclude (1) that the
rule restricted only the period of price-making; (2) that the
restriction was reasonable in scope, since it applied only to a
small part of the grain market in a single city, and only during
a small part of the business day; and (3) that the rule had no
appreciable effect either on general market prices or on the
total volume of grain coming to Chicago. In addition, the Court
found that local market conditions had in fact improved in
several identifiable respects during the period of the rule's op-
eration.25
In the absence of a judicially fashioned conclusive pre-
sumption that certain types of activity are unreasonable, such
an analysis is permitted: the reasonableness of the challenged
24. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
25. 246 U.S. at 239-41. The improvements included creating a public market in
which buying and selling could occur with adequate knowledge of actual market condi-
tions, thereby ameliorating the lot of rural dealers and farmers.
1975]
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conduct is evaluated by the jury in light of the relevant eco-
nomic facts. The Government is obliged to prove that the re-
straint in question has a detrimental effect on competition, the
defendant is entitled to offer rebutting evidence, and failure of
proof requires aquittal. The per se rule removes all of these
risks and responsibilities from the Government's shoulders,
replaces them with a conclusive presumption, and takes unrea-
sonableness as an element of the offense away from the jury.
The Per Se Concept
The case that introduced the full-blown concept of per se
illegality into Sherman Act litigation was United States v.
Trenton Potteries,2" in which the Government challenged a
price fixing agreement between manufacturers controlling 82
percent of the production and distribution of vitreous pottery
fixtures in the country. Defendants contended that because the
prices fixed by their agreement were reasonable, the agreement
itself was reasonable and therefore not in violation of the Sher-
man Act. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, reasoning
that the aim of every price-fixing agreement is to eliminate
competition." Focusing on the manipulative power inherent in
concerted action, rather than the manner in which the power
had been exercised, the Court concluded that agreements
which confer such potential monopoly status
may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or un-
lawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry
whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as
fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing
the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to
day whether it has become unreasonable through mere
variation of economic conditions.2 8
Since the Trenton Potteries decision, the per se rationale
has been expanded to cover classes of restraints other than
price fixing. Categories of absolutely prohibited conduct in-
26. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
27. Id. at 397.
28. Id. at 397-98.
29. A tying arrangement involves an agreement by a party to sell a product on
the condition that the buyer will also purchase a different "tied" product, or agree not
to purchase the "tied" product anywhere else, Von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine
-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 569, 576-77 n.88
(1964).
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clude tying arrangements, 9 group boycotts,30 and horizontal3'
and vertical" divisions of markets.
At the core of the per se concept in section 1 cases is the
judicial conclusion that, despite the Standard Oil"3 and
American Tobacco34 cases establishing unreasonableness as an
element of the offense to be proved, certain conduct is so
clearly anti-competitive in nature and so inherently devoid of
any purpose other than stifling competition, that it is conclu-
sively presumed, without further inquiry, to be unreasonable
and hence illegal. 5
Application of the Per Se Rule: An Empirical Consideration of
Reasonableness
Cases which have involved the per se rule demonstrate
that it operates as a conclusive presumption. At the same time,
it is a rule of experience which by its nature is factual. When
the Supreme Court is called upon to consider whether a partic-
ular restraint should be classified as a per se violation, the
Court typically inquires whether enough is known of both the
economic and business considerations out of which the arrange-
ment emerges, and of the actual impact of the arrangement on
competition, to provide material for the necessary analysis and
conclusion. Thus, in White Motor Co. v. United States," the
Court considered the legality of limitations placed by a sup-
plier on the territories in which independent distributors of its
products could operate and the customers to whom they could
sell. The Government urged that the restrictions be adjudged
per se illegal. The district court had accepted the Govern-
ment's argument and granted summary judgment in its favor
on that issue. The Supreme Court reversed. Noting that White
Motor was the first case to come before the Court involving a
vertical arrangement restricting territory, 7 Mr. Justice Doug-
las emphasized the need for a trial where the facts that would
30. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
31. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
32. See text accompanying notes 36-40 infra.
33. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
35. For a classic enunciation of the operation of and the principles behind the
per se rule, see Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Northern Pac. Rwy. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958).
36. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
37. Id. at 261.
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establish motive and economic effect could be produced and
examined:
Horizontal territorial limitations, like "[g]roup boy-
cotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders", are naked restraints of trade with no purpose
except stifling of competition. A vertical territorial limita-
tion may or may not have that purpose or effect. We do not
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of
which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They may
be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable
protections against aggressive competitors or the only
practicable means a small company has for breaking into
or staying in business and within the "rule of reason." We
need to know more than we do about the actual impact of
these arrangements on competition to decide whether they
have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack
. . . any redeeming virtue" and therefore should be classi-
fied as per se violations of the Sherman Act."
When such an inquiry into the "economic and business
stuff" of an arrangement is undertaken, judges have disagreed
as to the amount of experience with a particular restraint nec-
essary to warrant the conclusion that it is inherently perni-
cious. In United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. ," decided only
four years after White Motor, the Court declared the per se rule
applicable to territorial and customer restraints of the type
which White Motor declined to label per se violations. Mr.
Justice Stewart, joined in his dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan,
observed:
[T]he court in White Motor refused to apply a per se rule
to invalidate these restrictions, and declared that their
legality must be tested under the rule of reason by examin-
ing their actual impact in a particular competitive context.
The court today is unable to give any reasons why, only
four years later, this precedent should be overruled.
Surely, we have not in this short interim accumulated suf-
ficient new experience or insight to justify embracing a rule
automatically invalidating any vertical restraints in a dis-
tribution system based on sales to wholesalers and retail-
ers. Indeed, the court does not cite or discuss any new data
that might support such a radical change in the law."
38. Id. at 263 (citations omitted).
39. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
40. Id. at 389 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 16
THE PER SE RULE
Applications of the per se rule are based upon the courts'
conclusion that an overwhelming proportion of the cases in-
volving a particular restraint have demonstrated its unreasona-
bleness,4 and generally the rule is applied to new situations
only after a series of cases have developed a sufficient accumu-
lation of factual experience to support the conclusion.42 Catego-
rization is the product of an empirical process.
A Rule of Expedience
Particularly troublesome from a constitutional viewpoint
is the underlying rationale for the per se rule: it is a rule of
convenience or expedience. The Supreme Court has pointed
out that the per se rule avoids the necessity for extensive in-
quiry into whether a particular practice is reasonable or unrea-
sonable, and removes from the Government the burden of as-
certaining whether a practice acceptable in the past has be-
come unreasonable in light of altered economic conditions.43
The Court also has stressed that use of the per se rule elimi-
nates the need for "elaborate inquiry" as to the precise harm
the restraint might have caused, or the business excuse for its
use, and further avoids what the court has described as an
"incredibly complicated and prolonged" economic investiga-
tion into the history of the industry involved, all of which would
otherwise be necessary to determine whether a particular re-
straint was unreasonable.44
The position of the courts is that ordinarily a practice is
declared a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act only
41. E.g., Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 370 (2nd Cir. 1963).
42. Where such a practice has been before the court on numerous
occasions and has been uniformly condemned . . . the judicial mind
feels that it is unnecessary for a court to continue to weigh carefully its
purpose and effect. Rather, in the case of a practice which is a "hardened
offender," the courts take judicial notice that its effect is substantially
to restrain trade, and rule that there is an "inference or presumption"
that the only intent underlying the practice is to achieve such an anti-
competitive effect. Accordingly the courts thereupon rule that the prac-
tice is per se unlawful. However, these cases also show that generally a
restraint of trade in the past has been declared to be per se unlawful only
after a cumulative series of rulings-adverse to the practice-has given
the courts a solid basis for arriving at this per se condemnation.
J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 122-23 (1970 ed.) (footnote omitted).
43. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
44. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), reiterated in
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963); see United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319
F.2d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 1963).
1975]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
after a body of cases representing considerable judicial experi-
ence with that practice and its variations has demonstrated its
inherently anticompetitive nature. When the activity has been
examined initially under the rule of reason and repeatedly
found unreasonable, courts conclude that blanket prohibition
is appropriate, and conduct subsequently deemed to fit within
the general category is subject to the per se rule. The authors
contend that in a criminal proceeding this approach sacrifices
due process for judicial expedience, with respect to parties
whose activities are alleged to be included in one of the estab-
lished categories of per se illegality.
An activity such as the rebid agreement discussed in
connection with United States v. Manufacturers' Association
of the Relocatable Building Industry,45 may not in fact contrav-
ene the purposes of the Sherman Act at all. But because the
label "per se violation" has been applied to the broad category
of activities that can be called "price-fixing," the Manufac-
turers' Association defendants were afforded no opportunity
in a criminal proceeding to demonstrate the reasonableness
of their particular agreement.46
III. CONCLUSIVE FACTUAL PRESUMPTIONS DENY DUE PROCESS
At least in cases where they have not been challenged on
due process grounds, irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions
(as distinguished from rebuttable presumptions) have tradi-
tionally operated as rules of substantive law rather than as
rules of evidence. 7 While the term "presumption" has eviden-
tiary connotations, the conclusive nature of the irrebuttable
presumption effectively removes it from the fact-finding pro-
cess. Where such a presumption applies, once Fact A is found
to exist, Fact B (the presumed fact) must be inferred regardless
of any evidence to the contrary. However, in the final analysis,
the presumed fact is no more than a principle of substantive
law: given the existence of the basic fact, the substantive prin-
ciple declares the legal outcome either by conferring a benefit
or by imposing a burden.
The per se presumption, on the other hand, does have an
evidentiary effect. Given a determination that the conduct in
45. 462 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
46. See note 11 supra.
47. See Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions, supra note 6, at 462, citing 4 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1353 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972).
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question falls within a prohibited class, the fact of unreason-
ableness is presumed, and it is that fact with establishes crim-
inal or civil liability. This was the point rejected by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Manufacturers' Association of the
Relocatable Building Industry;48 that court emphatically de-
clared that the per se rule "is not even a rule of evidence."49
Recent Evidentiary Treatment of Conclusive Presumptions by
the United States Supreme Court
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit view, the United States
Supreme Court, in recent decisions dealing with due process
attacks on irrebuttable presumptions, in effect has treated
such presumptions as evidentiary rules involved in the process
of fact-finding. The decisions have invalidated statutes which
the Court construed or characterized as creating irrebuttable
presumptions, when it was "not necessarily or universally
true"50 that the basic fact implied the presumed fact, or when
experience proved the presumption "often contrary to fact."'"
In Vlandis v. Kline,5" the Court declared unconstitutional
a Connecticut statute which classified individuals on the basis
of present or former residence as nonresidents for the purpose
of determining tuition charges at a state university. The factors
used to determine classification were found to constitute an
irrebuttable presumption. The Court held:
[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an
individual resident rates on the basis of a permanent and
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that pre-
sumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and
when the state has reasonable alternative means of making
the crucial determination.53
Standards of due process, according to the Court, require that
students be afforded an opportunity to present evidence of
bona fide residency.54 Responding to the State's argument that
the school system would be the target of college-shoppers in the
48. 462 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1972). See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
49. Id. at 52.
50. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). See text accompanying notes 52-
55 infra.
51. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 519 (1973). See
text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
52. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
53. Id. at 452.
54. Id.
1975]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
absence of the provision, the court held that efficiency cannot
outweigh the individual student's right to a judicial determina-
tion of his entitlement to the reduced tuition afforded resi-
dents .
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,"
the Court considered section 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act of
1964,11 which excluded from the food stamp program any
household containing a person over 18 who had been claimed
as a tax dependent in the previous year by an individual not
himself eligible for food stamps. The court concluded that the
exclusion was based on an irrebuttable presumption as to the
relationship between the parent's prior deduction and the need
of a child living in another household, a presumption which
was sometimes contrary to fact and therefore a violation of due
process. 8
As those cases suggest, and as others discussed below will
demonstrate, the American judiciary has always felt a bit ill at
ease in the presence of presumptions," and especially so in the
presence of criminal presumptions.0 This discomfort is under-
standable, since a presumption removes the Government's nor-
mal burden of producing evidence on the fact in question suffi-
cient to support a criminal judgment against the defendant.
Indeed, as the following section will demonstrate, considera-
tions of due process have been held to be sufficient to strike
down even rebuttable presumptions.
Due Process and Rebuttable Presumptions: Judicial
Acceptance
Early in this century the use of rebuttable statutory pre-
sumptions was scrutinized but accepted. In Mobile, Jackson &
Kansas City Railroad v. Turnipseed,"' the Supreme Court ap-
proved a rebuttable statutory presumption of negligence on the
55. Id. at 451-52.
56. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(b) (1970).
58. 413 U.S. at 514.
59. "'Presumptions,' as happily stated by a scholarly counselor, ... 'may be
looked upon as bats of the law, flitting in the twilight but disappearing in the sunshine
of actual facts.'" Mockowit v. Kansas City, St. J. & Council Bluffs R.R., 196 Mo. 550,
571, 99 S.W. 256, 262 (1906).
60. Since the early 1900's the Court has required that the legislative power to
create presumptions be exercised in a non-arbitrary manner. See Note, Criminal Pre-
sumptions, supra note 6, at 344-45.
61. 219 U.S. 35, 41-43 (1910).
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part of a railroad. According to the Court, there was no denial
of due process because the party against whom the presump-
tion worked was afforded an opportunity to submit to the jury
in its defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue in ques-
tion."'
In Manley v. Georgia,3 the Court considered a rebuttable
criminal statutory presumption of fraudulent conduct on the
part of the president and directors of any bank which became
insolvent, and declared that a statute which creates a pre-
sumption that is arbitrary or that denies a fair opportunity to
repel it violates the due process clause. 4 The Court emphasized
that mere legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in
determining issues involving life, liberty or property. The
Court relied on language in McFarland v. American Sugar
Co.," which declared that it is "not within the province of a
legislature to declare an individual guilty of a crime."
At mid-century a seminal decision, Tot v. United States,"6
cleared up confusion regarding tests of the constitutionality of
statutory presumptions by approving the "rational connec-
tion" test: when the connection between the fact proved and
the fact presumed is so rational as to establish that the statu-
tory inference is not arbitrary, it is permissible to shift to the
defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence.67
A reformulation of the test was used in Leary v. United
States,5 which held that a criminal statutory presumption is
unconstitutional unless "the presumed fact is more likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to de-
pend." The Leary Court was not forced to determine whether
rebuttable criminal presumptions must meet a reasonable
62. The Court, using a "rational connection" formulation, determined that the
fact proved bore such reasonable relationship to the fact presumed as to indicate that
the legislative inference was not arbitrary. That, in conjunction with the defendant's
opportunity to rebut the presumption, was sufficient to satisfy due process require-
ments. Id. at 43; see Note, Criminal Presumptions, supra note 6, at 344-45. See also
Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913), which upheld on a Turnipseed rationale a
rebuttable presumption that a naturalization certificate had been obtained by an alien
with lack of intent to become a permanent citizen.
63. 279 U.S. 1 (1929).
64. Id. at 6.
65. 241 U.S. 79, 89 (1916).
66. 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (one in receipt of weapon presumed to have obtained it
through interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Firearms Act).
67. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.ll (1973).
68. 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969), citing United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965);
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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doubt standard as well as the "more likely than not" standard
in order to satisfy due process requirements, and subsequent
decisions also have hedged the issue.6"
Thus the courts have accepted use of rebuttable presump-
tions under circumscribed conditions. Conclusive presump-
tions, on the other hand, do more than allocate the burden of
proof; once applied, they terminate examination of an issue.7
To analyze the use of the conclusive presumption inherent in
the per se rule, it will be helpful to take a historical look at
judicial treatment of conclusive presumptions and due process
considerations.
Due Process and Irrebuttable Presumptions: History Shows A
Marked Contrast in Judicial Attitude
Conclusive presumptions have not fared as well as rebutta-
ble presumptions in the courts. In Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,'
the Court found no adequate basis for upholding a conclusive
presumption that gifts made inter vivos within six years of
death were in contemplation of death. The state trial court had
determined that the donor, within six years of his death, had
made four sizable gifts aggregating more than five million dol-
69. The Court in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), discussed the
relationship between the rational connection test and the reasonable doubt standard:
• . . To the extent that the "rational connection," "more likely than
not," and "reasonable doubt" standards bear ambiguous relationships to
one another, the ambiguity is traceable in large part to variations in
language and focus rather than to differences of substance. What has
been established by the cases, however, is at least this: that if a statutory
inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satis-
fies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to
invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred
fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not stan-
dard, then it clearly accords. with due process.
[The evidence in this case] was clearly sufficient to enable the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew the checks were
stolen. Since the inference thus satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard,
the most stringent standard the Court has applied in judging permissive
criminal law inferences, we conclude that it satisfies the requirements of
due process.
Id. at 843, 845-46. The Barnes fact situation thus permitted the Court to avoid deter-
mining which of the two standards governs. The decision which first considered the
applicability of the reasonable doubt standard to statutory criminal presumptions was
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). See Note, Criminal Presumptions, supra
note 6, at 352-53.
70. See note 6 supra.
71. 270 U.S. 230 (1926).
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lars to his wife and three children, but that none of the gifts
had been made in expectation, apprehension or contemplation
of death. The presumption was arbitrary, since gifts inter vivos
within six years of death were conclusively presumed to have
been a substitute for testamentary disposition, whatever the
true facts, while like gifts made more than six years before
death were not so treated. Responding to the state's assertion
that the presumption was necessary to prevent evasion of in-
heritance taxes, the Court stated that rights guaranteed by the
Constitution took precedence over the alleged necessity."
An identical statutory tax presumption was considered by
the Court in Heiner v. Donnan,73 which held that basing the
imposition of a tax on an assumption of fact which the taxpayer
is forbidden to controvert is so arbitrary and unreasonable that
it violates the fifth amendment. The Government in Heiner
had argued that the conclusive presumption created by the
statute was actually a rule of substantive law. The Supreme
Court disposed of that contention by pointing out that a re-
buttable presumption, which is clearly a rule of evidence shift-
ing the burden of proof, cannot be transformed into a rule of
substantive law by the simple expedient of enacting a statute
making it conclusive.74 Whether the presumption is a rule of
evidence or a rule of substantive law, it is a substitute for proof,
open to challenge if it is rebuttable, and conclusive if it is
irrebuttable.75 Treated as a rule of evidence or as a rule of
substantive law, the presumption in Heiner constituted an at-
tempt by the legislature to enact into existence a fact. Since a
legislative body is without power to enact as a rule of evidence
a statute denying a litigant the right to prove the facts of his
case, the Court determined that "certainly the power cannot
be made to emerge by putting the enactment in the guise of a
rule of substantive law."7
In United States v. Provident Trust Co.," the Court re-
fused to apply, despite the urging of the Government, the con-
clusive common law presumption that a woman is capable of
bearing children as long as she lives. The case involved evalua-
tion for estate tax purposes of charitable remainders preceded
72. Id. at 240.
73. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
74. Id. at 329.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 291 U.S. 272 (1934).
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by life estates in the decedent's daughter and her issue. The
daughter had had her reproductive organs surgically removed
prior to the date in question. The Government argued that the
presumption was a valid rule of substantive law designed to
maximize the value of the taxable estate. The Court responded
by citing an earlier decision which held that all presumptions
as to matters of fact capable of tangible proof are in their
nature disputable: no conclusive character attaches to them,
and they may always be rebutted and overthrown."8 The Court
perceived no considerations of expediency and no policy so
compelling in character (the historical bases for formulation
and application of conclusive presumptions) as to warrant ac-
ceptance of the Government's theory. In fact, it concluded that
the Government's position would subvert rather than sustain
the policy of encouraging charitable bequests by exempting
them from the provisions of the estate tax.79
In light of the foregoing decisions, it is not surprising to
find that in Morissette v. United States,"° the Court overturned
a criminal conviction despite the fact that the defendant had
admittedly taken discarded government bomb casings from a
practice bombing range. Morissette believed that the property
had been abandoned by the government, and did not know that
he was doing anything in violation of the law. He was convicted
under a statute which did not by its terms require any element
of knowledge or specific intent to establish guilt; the trial court
had ruled that the only intent required was an intent to take
the property which was in fact taken. Conceding the minor
nature of the offense involved, the Court nevertheless found the
due process issue "fundamental and far-reaching."'"
In the face of substantial evidence that Morissette had
lacked any vestige of criminal intent, the trial judge refused to
submit the issue of felonious intent to the jury; he ruled that
the statute did not require any particular state of mind, and
that even if mens rea was an essential element of the offense,
criminal intent was to be conclusively presumed from the act
of taking.
The Supreme Court reversed. Construing the statute as
requiring felonious intent despite Congress' failure to specify
78. Id. at 284, citing Lincoln v. French, 105 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1881).
79. Id. at 285-86.
80. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
81. Id. at 247.
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mens rea,s2 the Court pointed out that where the state of mind
of the accused is an element of the offense charged, its exist-
ence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury. 3
However clear the proof may be, or however incontrovertible
the inference of criminal intent may seem to the judge, the
issue of intent can never be ruled on as a question of law. 4 In
the words of the Court:
We think presumptive intent has no place in this case. A
conclusive presumption which testimony could not over-
throw would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient
of the offense. A presumption which would permit but not
require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact
would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach
of its own volition. A presumption which would permit the
jury to make an assumption which all the evidence consid-
ered together does not logically establish would give to a
proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. In either case,
the presumption would conflict with the overriding pre-
sumption of innocence with which the law endows the ac-
cused and which extends to every element of the crime.
Such incriminating presumptions are not to be improvised
by the judiciary. 5
Judicial disapproval of conclusive criminal presumptions
continued on into the late sixties, as evidenced by United
States v. Bowen. s" Bowen had been convicted of failing to re-
port for induction into the military. His defense was based
upon the failure of the draft board to supply him with a re-
quested conscientious objector application prior to the sched-
uled date for induction. The board countered by asserting that
forms had been mailed to defendant in accordance with his
request, and relied upon a Selective'Service regulation provid-
ing that mailing of any form to a registrant shall constitute
notice to him of the contents, whether actually received by him
or not. The Court, reviewing many of the cases discussed above
as well as two state court decisions,87 treated this regulation as
creating an irrebuttable presumption of receipt of the form,
82. Id. at 247-48.
83. Id. at 247.
84. Id., citing People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E. 267, 270 (1891).
85. Id. at 275 (footnote omitted).
86. 414 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1969).
87. Carolene Products Co. v. McLaughlin, 365 Il. 62, 5 N.E.2d 447 (1936); Juster
Bros. v. Christgan, 219 Minn. 108, 7 N.W.2d 501 (1943).
19751
74 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
and held that such a presumption violated the fifth amend-
ment."
Principles Analyzed
Several constitutional principles can be distilled from the
cases cited. A rebuttable presumption of fact, which affords the
affected party the opportunity to introduce all available evi-
dence contradicting the inferred fact, is permissible,89 and is
tolerated even in a criminal case so long as there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed.'"
However, an irrebuttable factual presumption which either
operates without regard to actualities, or is not universally or
even necessarily true in fact, denies due process of law." Fur-
ther, the legislature is powerless under the Constitution to de-
clare the existence of a fact, even though the legislative fiat
poses as a rule of evidence, when it forecloses a litigant's right
to prove that an element of the charged offense is absent. An
attempt to do so cannot be sustained by merely labeling the
enactment a rule of substantive law.2 Moreover, in a criminal
prosecution the judiciary has no greater power than the legisla-
ture to improvise incriminating irrebuttable presumptions of
fact as a substitute for proof of an essential ingredient of the
offense charged. 3
The per se rule, when applied in a criminal antitrust prose-
cution, violates those principles. This judicially articulated
and expanded doctrine, adopted in essence as a rule of conveni-
ence designed to dispense with otherwise necessary and appro-
priate proof on complex issues, is a conclusive presumption of
fact that certain conduct is by virtue of its very existence un-
reasonable. The element of unreasonableness is essential to a
finding of liability, either civil or criminal, under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 4 The per se presumption is irrebuttable and
88. 414 F.2d at 1273.
89. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Tumipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). See
text accompanying note 61 supra.
90. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943). See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
91. E.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952). See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
92. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). See text accompanying notes 73-76
supra.
93. Morissette v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). See text accompanying notes
83-84 supra.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See note 1 supra.
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forecloses the criminal defendant from introducing any evi-
dence that the challenged conduct is in fact reasonable or oth-
erwise defensible as consistent with the language and objec-
tives of the antitrust laws.
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has declined
to accept that reasoning,9" the point is an open one in other
circuits and in the Supreme Court; it can be anticipated that
appropriate circumstances for testing it will be before the
courts again.
IV. THE PER SE RULE AND REASONABLE DouBT
The use of the per se rule in a criminal case may be exam-
ined from an additional perspective. In In re Winship," the
Supreme Court said:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stat-
ure of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged. 7
Although the theory has not yet been approved by the
United States Supreme Court, it has been argued-correctly,
we contend-that the Winship standard should apply to crimi-
nal presumptions. In United States v. Johnson," it was held
that because proof beyond a reasonable doubt is itself an indis-
pensable ingredient of due process in criminal cases, a rule of
inference which can pass the rational connection or "more
likely than not" test must still satisfy the criminal reasonable
doubt standard of proof if it is used to establish an essential
element of the crime. The use of the per se rule in a criminal
antitrust case, however, absolves the Government of the re-
quirement of proving the element of unreasonableness. In addi-
tion, the rule as interpreted deprives the accused of any oppor-
tunity to offer controverting evidence of reasonableness or jus-
tification of the conduct charged. Thus, the use of the per se
rule does not seem to be an adequate substitute for proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
95. United States v. Manufacturers' Ass'n of the Relocatable Bldg. Indus., 462
F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1972). See notes 9-14 supra.
96. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
97. Id. at 364.
98. 433 F.2d 1160, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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V. CONCLUSION
An attack on the per se rule undoubtedly appears to be a
call for a major reversal of antitrust precedent. In fact, the
authors of this article advocate only that a defendant be af-
forded the right to dispute the existence of a fact which is vital
to the Government's charge. It is not unreasonable to assert
that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be denied that right.
What more dangerous principle can be found than one that
dispenses with proof of a vital factual element on the ground
that, in the opinion of judges, a certain type of economic re-
striction is unreasonable most of the time, and thus in the
interests of expedited judicial administration a crucial ques-
tion may be excluded from the jury's consideration?
To ask the question is to grasp the answer. The Govern-
ment cannot be allowed conclusively to assume facts in a crimi-
nal case. In short, the per se rule is not constitutionally appro-
priate for use in a criminal antitrust prosecution.
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